The Problem of Knowledge in a Postmodern
Society: Lyotardian Incredulity and Baudrillardian Nihilism in Lionel Shriver’s
We Need to Talk about Kevin.
The publication
of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern
Condition in 1979 sparked considerable debate on the possibility of obtaining
objective knowledge. Postmodern theorists have argued that this is an outdated
Enlightenment ideal which fails to recognise cultural relativity. It is
undeniable that postmodern deconstructive techniques have been very important
in the development of postcolonial and queer theory and certain branches of feminism. However, Lyotard’s work considers all claims of moral
and epistemological ‘truths’ in terms of ‘metanarrative’ and Jean Baudrillard’s
Simulation and Simulacra (1981)
argues that our postmodern society has entirely lost the ‘real.’ This has
provoked heated responses from empiricists of numerous disciplines and
particularly from scientists.
I shall briefly outline Lyotard’s and Baudrillard’s theories on knowledge, truth and ‘the real’ and the empiricist criticisms of them before considering Lionel Shriver’s We Need to Talk about Kevin (2003) as a postmodern text which explores the concepts of metanarrative, truth, knowledge and reality. It will be argued that Franklin ascribes wholly to metanarratives and is unable to perceive anything outside them. Eva will be shown to exhibit Lyotardian incredulity towards metanarratives and an attempt to negotiate her way through life using language games whilst Kevin rejects prescribed ‘truths’ utterly, epitomising Baudrillardian concepts of ‘nihilism’ and ‘terrorism.’
I shall briefly outline Lyotard’s and Baudrillard’s theories on knowledge, truth and ‘the real’ and the empiricist criticisms of them before considering Lionel Shriver’s We Need to Talk about Kevin (2003) as a postmodern text which explores the concepts of metanarrative, truth, knowledge and reality. It will be argued that Franklin ascribes wholly to metanarratives and is unable to perceive anything outside them. Eva will be shown to exhibit Lyotardian incredulity towards metanarratives and an attempt to negotiate her way through life using language games whilst Kevin rejects prescribed ‘truths’ utterly, epitomising Baudrillardian concepts of ‘nihilism’ and ‘terrorism.’
The postmodern condition at its most simple, argues Lyotard, is ‘an incredulity toward metanarratives’ (1979 pxxiv.) He goes on to say that from the end of the 19th century, ‘an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge’ began to cause a change in the status of knowledge (p39.) By the 1960s, the resulting ‘doubt’ and ‘demoralisation’ of scientists had made ‘an impact on the central problem of legitimisation’ (p8.) However, scientists are by no means sure they are doubtful and demoralised. In a critique of postmodernism, Intellectual Impostures (1997) French physicists Sokal and Bricmont argue that this ‘relative attitude is at odds with scientists’ idea of their own practice. While scientists try, as best they can, to obtain an objective view of (certain aspects of) the world, relativist thinkers tell them that they are wasting their time and that such an enterprise is, in principle, an illusion. We are thus dealing with a fundamental conflict’ (Loc 967.)
In this conflict, an important argument for an objective morality is presented by the neuroscientist, Sam Harris in The Moral landscape (2011.) Harris’ chapter ‘Moral Truth’ read alongside Lyotard’s ‘Narratives of the Legitimation of Knowledge’ reveals their initial arguments to be remarkably similar. They both stress that consensus should not be mistaken for ‘truth’ and emphasise that positive knowledge cannot, in itself, dictate morality. Harris’ image of a landscape with many peaks representing different ways of achieving wellbeing could be seen to parallel Lyotard’s paralogy of legitimation. However, Harris asserts that ‘There are facts – real facts – to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible wellbeing’ (p30) whilst Lyotard argues ‘the only role positive knowledge can play is to inform the subject about the reality …what should be done is not within the purview of positive knowledge’ (p36.)
Jean Baudrillard, in Simulacra and Simulation argues that a postmodern society has moved beyond meaning in any form and is comprised entirely of signs which have lost all connection with any external reality and become ‘hyperreal’ (1981. p1.) ‘The universe of the simulation is transreal and transfinite: no test of reality will come to put an end to it – except the total collapse and slippage of the terrain’ (p157.) Sokal and Bricmont analyse two of Baudrillard’s claims; that science too has come to suspect that reality is so uncertain that physical laws can be reversed[1] and also that a reversal of cause and effect is supported by chaos theory[2]. They demonstrate that neither of those claims makes sense in scientific terms and convincingly argue that ‘one finds in Baudrillard’s works a profusion of scientific terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a context where they are manifestly irrelevant’ (1997. loc2307.)
When Baudrillard speaks of ‘objectivity of which science is never
certain, of which it secretly despairs’ (1981 p129) and Lyotard asks ‘What proof is there
that my proof is true’(1979 p24) they express the radical scepticism to which the biologist Richard Dawkins has replied ‘Because it works. Planes fly. Cars drive,
computers compute. If you base medicine on science you cure people. It works’ (News.com.au. 2013.) Similarly, the philosopher
David Detmer argues ‘The fault in …many contemporary postmodernists is not
merely that they fail to subject their beliefs to abstract, artificial, purely
formal and logical tests, but that they fail to notice that they cannot live by
those beliefs’ (2003. loc 170.)
We Need to Talk about Kevin can be read as an exploration of different attitudes towards knowledge and the attempts to live by them. Franklin, with his commitment to the metanarratives of America and father-son relationships, regards ‘redemption as an act of will’ (p15) and can be seen to symbolise the more unified of Lyotard’s two narratives of legitimation. Lyotard relates this model to the German concept of Bildung in which a principle and an ideal are unified by a single philosophy (pp32-5.) Eva describes Franklin’s ‘heartrending tendency to mistake what you actually had for what you desperately wanted’ (p16.) In this narrative, Lyotard argues ‘every possible referent is taken up not from the point of view of immediate truth value but …by virtue of occupying a certain place in the itinerary of spirit or life’ (p35.) To Franklin ‘Earthly countries and single malignant little boys can go to hell; the idea of countries and the idea of sons triumph for eternity’ (p80.) Bildung has its origins in Christian theology and Eva says of Franklin ‘Although neither of us went to church I came to conclude that you were a naturally religious person’ (p88.)
Kevin’s use of language reflects Baudrillard’s notion that speech is a form of force exerted to force children to agree with the system. ‘Children speak … not through some sort of "liberation" of their speech, but because adult reason has given itself the most subtle means to avert the threat of their silence’ (1981 p136.) As a young child, Kevin does not speak and Eva does find this threatening. ‘Kevin’s silence had an oppressive quality’ (p112.) When Kevin chooses to engage in language games, his ‘moves’ are deconstructive. When Eva tries to engage him in conversation on their ‘mother-son’ outing, he uses her own adjectives to attack and silence her (p279.)
Baudrillard uses the imagery of a ‘black hole’ to describe postmodern society in ‘In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities’ (1983 p8) and in ‘On Nihilism’ he says ‘Society is … nihilistic, in the sense that it has the power to pour everything… into indifference’ (1981 p163.) Eva uses several images of dark holes to describe Kevin. He has an ‘apathy so absolute it’s like a hole you might fall in’ (p57.) ‘(H)is pupils were thick and sticky as a tar pit’ (p295.) ‘I’m not sure that I want to understand Kevin, to find a well within myself so inky that from its depths what he did makes sense’(p167.)
We Need to Talk about Kevin can be read as an exploration of different attitudes towards knowledge and the attempts to live by them. Franklin, with his commitment to the metanarratives of America and father-son relationships, regards ‘redemption as an act of will’ (p15) and can be seen to symbolise the more unified of Lyotard’s two narratives of legitimation. Lyotard relates this model to the German concept of Bildung in which a principle and an ideal are unified by a single philosophy (pp32-5.) Eva describes Franklin’s ‘heartrending tendency to mistake what you actually had for what you desperately wanted’ (p16.) In this narrative, Lyotard argues ‘every possible referent is taken up not from the point of view of immediate truth value but …by virtue of occupying a certain place in the itinerary of spirit or life’ (p35.) To Franklin ‘Earthly countries and single malignant little boys can go to hell; the idea of countries and the idea of sons triumph for eternity’ (p80.) Bildung has its origins in Christian theology and Eva says of Franklin ‘Although neither of us went to church I came to conclude that you were a naturally religious person’ (p88.)
Psychiatrist Gerald Wiviott discusses
the psychology of fundamentalist thinking, religious and otherwise, arguing
that ‘fundamentalists see the
world as if their knowledge of it were absolute. Rigidly held beliefs,
intolerance of alternative points of view (and a) capacity to reinterpret
history to fit their worldview’ (2007. p3-4) are all traits of fundamentalism. Franklin’s views as described by
Eva show this mind-set ‘History is made of empires, and the United States was
by far and away the greatest, richest, and fairest empire that had ever
dominated the earth’ (p37.)
Wiviott advocates a ‘contextual epistemology’ which recognises ‘that much of
what we call knowledge is culturally determined’ but argues that
‘postmodernists, in taking … relativity to an extreme, make moral principles
seem vague and trivial. One might make the case that fundamentalist ideologies
are a growing response… to the lack of moral absolutes’ (p4.)
If Franklin conforms to
Lyotard’s second, unified, narrative of legitimation, Eva is, at first,
self-consciously committed to what Lyotard describes as the first, critical,
version which legitimates itself upon ideals of an ‘autonomous collectivity,’
finding validity in the human subject (p36.) That Eva is sceptical of the
prescriptions of the collective on maternal behaviour even whilst conforming to
them is shown in her language. ‘I have no end of failings as a mother, but I
have always followed the rules’ (p39.) ‘It is against the rules, isn’t it, to actually have
a baby and spend any time at all on that banished parallel life in which you
didn’t’ (p12.) ‘I was not
following the program… I had dismally failed us and our newborn baby’ (p83.) However, Lyotard’s argument that ‘we
no longer have recourse to the grand narratives …even to the emancipation of
humanity’ (p60) is shown when, after the shootings, Eva loses her
tenuous commitment to this more critical, idealistic narrative. ‘Though once a
staunch democrat -I long ago gave up on defending humanity. It’s beyond me, on
most days, to defend myself’ (p65.)
These two narratives of
legitimation, represented here in Franklin’s assured denotative utterances and
Eva’s slightly ironic prescriptive ones, Lyotard argues, require ‘totally
different language games’ (p36) and Eva describes their conversations about
having children in these terms ‘These talks of ours had a gameliness, and your
opening play was noncommittal’ (p16.)Before Kevin, Eva’s and Franklin’s
language games produced, if not agreement, co-operative moves which enabled
their relationship to work. In
Lyotard’s theory of language games ‘if there are no rules, there is no game
…even an infinitesimal modification of one rule alters the nature of the game’
(p10.) From Eva’s perspective, Franklin changed the rules. When he says “Never, ever tell me that you regret
our own kid,” Eva perceives a drastic change. ‘(S)ince
when was there anything that one of us was never, ever to say?’ (p64.) Eva’s moves are then restricted. ‘I would never reveal to anyone on
earth that childbirth had left me unmoved. You had your unspeakable...now I had
mine. I would reach for that word, indescribable’ (p83.) Finally, they lose the ability to
communicate at all. The title of the novel indicates how central this is to
the plot. Eva says ‘I’d have given my eye teeth to be
able to talk to you’ (p293.) Eva
is gradually silenced over the course of the novel as she is removed from the
language game. Lyotard says ‘a player is silenced not because he has been
refuted but because his ability to participate has been threatened’ and ‘This
behaviour is terrorist’ (p63.) Interestingly, the ‘terrorist’ responsible is
not Eva’s fundamentalist husband but her nihilist son.
Kevin’s use of language reflects Baudrillard’s notion that speech is a form of force exerted to force children to agree with the system. ‘Children speak … not through some sort of "liberation" of their speech, but because adult reason has given itself the most subtle means to avert the threat of their silence’ (1981 p136.) As a young child, Kevin does not speak and Eva does find this threatening. ‘Kevin’s silence had an oppressive quality’ (p112.) When Kevin chooses to engage in language games, his ‘moves’ are deconstructive. When Eva tries to engage him in conversation on their ‘mother-son’ outing, he uses her own adjectives to attack and silence her (p279.)
Baudrillard uses the imagery of a ‘black hole’ to describe postmodern society in ‘In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities’ (1983 p8) and in ‘On Nihilism’ he says ‘Society is … nihilistic, in the sense that it has the power to pour everything… into indifference’ (1981 p163.) Eva uses several images of dark holes to describe Kevin. He has an ‘apathy so absolute it’s like a hole you might fall in’ (p57.) ‘(H)is pupils were thick and sticky as a tar pit’ (p295.) ‘I’m not sure that I want to understand Kevin, to find a well within myself so inky that from its depths what he did makes sense’(p167.)
Kevin can be seen to represent a Baudrillardian sense of meaninglessness in numerous ways. Baudrillard says ‘Melancholia is the inherent quality of the mode of the disappearance of meaning’ and Eva says of Kevin ‘underneath the levels of fury… lay a carpet of despair. He wasn’t mad. He was sad’ (p236.) However, Kevin was angry with those who found meaning in life and made them his victims. He found them ridiculous but ‘impenetrable passions have never made Kevin laugh. From early childhood, they have enraged him’ (p247.) Baudrillard also aggressively rejects the idea of finding pleasure and meaning in life. ‘One can exalt the ruses of desire… but this does not resolve the imperious necessity of checking the system in broad daylight. This, only terrorism can do’ (p163.)
Brendan Butterfield argues ‘Against the system and its passive nihilism, Baudrillard proffers his own brand of what might be termed active nihilism, a praxis that includes theoretical and aesthetic "terrorism," but not, in the end, the bloody acts of actual violence his theory accounts for’(2002:4.) Kevin, of course, does commit bloody acts of violence. Significantly, he speaks the single word ‘maleficence’ whilst doing so. This is the name of Baudrillard’s second order of simulation – the appearance of evil in which a profound reality is distorted (p6.) If Kevin’s actions are an attempt to do something real or meaningful through ‘evil’, they are as ineffective as Baudrillard predicts they will be. When Baudrillard says ‘This is the victory of the other nihilism, the other terrorism, that of the system’ (p164,) Butterfield argues that he is expressing his ‘ utmost pessimism regarding the subject's ability to effect a change in the system, which in the end neutralizes every event, no matter how deadly’(3.) Eighteen months after the shooting ‘Kevin is already yesterday’s news’ (p41) and when Eva asks him to explain his motivations for the shootings, he says ’I used to think I knew…now I am not so sure’ (p397.) The novel ends shortly after this answer which would seem unsatisfactory or evasive to many people. Eva, however, recognises an uncharacteristically genuine response and can respect an admission of the lack of knowledge. She is hopeful that, for Kevin, ‘progress is deconstruction’ (p397) and this mild optimism towards language games and the deconstruction of metanarratives is purely Lyotardian.
We have seen that attitudes towards knowledge and
reality have been the root of conflict in this novel and I have outlined how this reflects the disputes between postmodernists
and empiricists as they continue to contest how much we can actually ‘know’ and
how much we construct for ourselves. Franklin’s construction of an absolute
‘truth’ has been contrasted with Eva’s Lyotardian incredulity and Kevin’s
Baudrillardian nihilism. If there is a conclusion to be reached in this novel,
it could be argued to be that neither blind acceptance nor hostile rejection of
‘truths’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘meaning’ work well in today’s society.
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